“The only thing that Cabinet changed was to define the G20 summit area as a “public work”. All the “new” police powers been in existence for decades.
There is some issue as to whether or not the G20 summit area should have been defined as a “public work” and whether or not the manner in which the regulation was passed gave fair notice to the citizenry that is, after all, presumed to know the law. (In Campanella the fact that the public area had signs posted warning of potential searches was relevant to the Court). But this issue is fairly minor compared to the claims made suggesting the law is the first step towards a Police State.”
As Rosenberg, J.A. notes, the appellant:
“voluntarily produced her purse for manual inspection, a purse which she acknowledged would have set off the metal detector. As the Hamilton Police Service Special Constable conducting the screening opened the purse, he saw a baggie that he removed from the purse and which contained a small quantity of marihuana. The appellant was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled drug contrary to s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19. ” (at para. 1)
 First, courthouse searches like the one carried out in this case are not conducted for the purpose of criminal investigation. The state and the individual are not antagonists in the same way that they are in a criminal investigation. The search is not conducted for the purpose of enforcing the criminal law or investigating a criminal offence.
 Second, even if the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal belongings when entering a courthouse, that expectation is considerably diminished. Prominent signs warn everyone that they will be subjected to a security search and that they are not permitted to bring weapons or dangerous items into the courthouse. Regrettably, in this day and age, people expect that they will be subject to some kind of security screening when entering prominent public buildings such as courthouses or the Legislature. These buildings, which are symbols of authority, are believed to be potential targets by some individuals and groups. People reasonably expect that everyone without prior clearance will be searched on a non-discriminatory basis in a reasonable manner to ensure the safety of all persons in attendance at the building.
 Third, as the Crown points out, the persons being searched are also the beneficiaries of the process. Like the security clearance at airports, the search provides reassurance to all members of the public that they will be safe from attack by persons with weapons within the confines of the courthouse despite the sometimes volatile nature of the proceedings.
What the R. v. Campanella decision does not address is the constitutionality of the reverse onus clause under s.5(1) of the PWPA and whether it violates the presumption of innocence protected under section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The only way that such a provision can survive Charter scrutiny is if it can be justified under section 1.
In these circumstances, I doubt that s. 5(1) of the PWPA falls within the “reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Until someone mounts a constitutional challenge on that basis, the court of public opinion will have to do.