The first decision is from the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Van Damme v. Gelber, 2013 ONCA 388 (Ont. C.A.) per Doherty, J.A. (Cronk and Lauwers JJ.A. concurring). In Van Damme, the plaintiff, a successful businessman and philanthropist obtained judgment in the Supreme Court of New York against the defendant, Nahum Gelber (“Gelber”), relating to Van Damme’s purchase of a painting from Gelber. The painting was being held in Ontario pursuant to an Ontario court order. Van Damme successfully moved in the Ontario proceeding for an order of recognition and enforcement New York judgment in Ontario and a variation of the earlier Ontario order directing that the painting be released to him, with costs on a substantial indemnity basis. (more…)
Archive for the ‘Pleadings’ Category
Douglas E. Abrams, “Plagiarism in Lawyers’ Advocacy: Imposing Discipline for Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice”July 23, 2012
Douglas E. Abrams (University of Missouri School of Law) has posted “Plagiarism in Lawyers’ Advocacy: Imposing Discipline for Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice“, Wake Forest Law Review, Forthcoming/University of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-22. Here is the abstract:
In a recent high-profile prosecution, the federal district court criticized defense counsel for filing a post-trial brief that copied passages from previously published material without attribution. The court followed other recent decisions that, since about 2000, have chastised lawyers for briefs marked by plagiarism. Some lawyers had copied passages from earlier judicial opinions that rest in the public domain, and some lawyers (as in the recent prosecution) had copied passages from private sources that are subject to the copyright laws. In either event, courts have labeled lawyers’ plagiarism “reprehensible,” “intolerable,” “completely unacceptable,” and “unprofessional.”
The courts have found or intimated that counsel’s plagiarized submission violated Rule 8.4(c) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” Perhaps because Model Rule 8.4(c)’s four proscriptions normally seem such natural fits, courts finding plagiarism have not yet explored application of Model Rule 8.4(d), which reaches lawyers who “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Grounding professional discipline in both provisions would not be redundant because under the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, a single act may violate more than one ethical duty and multiple violations would be relevant to the sanction imposed.
Lawyers’ plagiarism in briefs and other filings violates Model Rule 8.4(d) as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice because this plagiarism creates a risk that the court’s written opinion itself will inadvertently plagiarize. A lawyer’s plagiarism can also distort the meaning and import of parties’ adversary argument by inducing the court to mistake the copied passages as products of the lawyer’s own thought processes, rather than as an uncompensated non-party’s analysis presumably helpful to the proponent.
A pdf copy of the paper may be downloaded via SSRN here.
Joe S. Cecil et al., “”Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim after Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules”July 20, 2011
Joe S. Cecil (Federal Judicial Center), George W. Cort, Margaret S. Williams (Federal Judicial Center) and Jared J. Bataillon have posted “Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim after Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules”. Here is the abstract:
This report presents the findings of a Federal Judicial Center study on the filing and resolution of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The study was requested by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. The study compared motion activity in 23 federal district courts in 2006 and 2010 and included an assessment of the outcome of motions in orders that do not appear in the computerized legal reference systems such as Westlaw. Statistical models were used to control for such factors as differences in levels of motion activity in individual federal district courts and types of cases.
After excluding cases filed by prisoners and pro se parties, and after controlling for differences in motion activity across federal district courts and across types of cases and for the presence of an amended complaint, we found the following: There was a general increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate of filing of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim (see infra section III.A); In general, there was no increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend. There was, in particular, no increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend in civil rights cases and employment discrimination cases (see infra section III.B.1); Only in cases challenging mortgage loans on both federal and state law grounds did we find an increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend. Many of these cases were removed from state to federal court. This category of cases tripled in number during the relevant period in response to events in the housing market (see infra section III.B.1). There is no reason to believe that the rate of dismissals without leave to amend would have been lower in 2006 had such cases existed then; There was no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which a grant of a motion to dismiss terminated the case (see infra section III.B.1).
A .pdf copy of the article is available for download from SSRN here.
- Henry S. Noyes, “The Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: Iqbal, Twombly and the Application of Judicial Experience” (thetrialwarrior.com)
- Noyes on Twombly/Iqbal and Judicial Experience (lawprofessors.typepad.com)
- Dustin B. Benham, “Twombly and Iqbal Should (Finally!) Put the Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud Out of Its Misery” (thetrialwarrior.com)
Dustin B. Benham, “Twombly and Iqbal Should (Finally!) Put the Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud Out of Its Misery”May 5, 2011
Dustin B. Benham (Texas Tech University School of Law) has published “Twombly and Iqbal Should (Finally!) Put the Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud Out of Its Misery”, SMU Law Rev., Vol. 64, 2011.
The abstract reads:
The proliferation of digital evidence and discovery has raised serious questions about litigation fraud in recent years. Legal tabloids are often headlined with the latest example of discovery abuse that resulted in multi-million dollar sanctions. But what about the cases of serious discovery abuse or perjury that neither the opposing party nor the court ever catch? These abuses may very well lead to judgments that do not reflect a result based on the true merits of the case. If a party seeks relief based on fraud within one year from the entry of judgment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) gives the trial court plenary power to vacate the judgment. For fraud discovered outside of one year, however, the district court’s powers are more limited, and relief is often contingent upon whether the fraud is deemed intrinsic or extrinsic. Indeed, a majority of the circuits hold that after one year a party cannot obtain post-judgment relief based on perjury or discovery abuse because these frauds are intrinsic. This article contends that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud should be abolished because Twombly and Iqbal have created an effective pleading-stage screening mechanism to prevent the meritless re-litigation of cases.
This article proceeds in five parts. Part II examines the origins and history of modern post-judgment relief before and after the adoption of Rule 60. Next, Part III explores the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud in the context of independent actions. Part IV of this article addresses the rise of plausibility pleading in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. In these cases, the Supreme Court overruled Conley v. Gibson, announcing a new pleading paradigm that applies to all civil actions filed in federal court, including a judgment-relief action. In a move away from notice-pleading, the Court held that a civil complaint must plausibly allege a cause of action. Finally, Part V of this article contends that this increased pleading scrutiny serves as a better screening mechanism for post-judgment fraud claims than the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud does. By screening fraud claims individually, a court can better assess whether the claim could have been raised in the original litigation. Screening cases for this trait results in a better balance between the often-competing values of judgments that reflect truth and judgments that are final.
(Number of Pages in PDF File: 59)
The article may be downloaded via SSRN here.
- Decision of Interest: Twombly/Iqbal and Affirmative Defenses (lawprofessors.typepad.com)
- The Situational Effects of Iqbal (thesituationist.wordpress.com)