1. Whether an Illinois court order granting $19 million in damages and a permanent injunction against the defendants was enforceable in Canada? and
“The appellants argue that a fourth category of defence should be added to the categories accepted in Beals on the basis of a denial of a meaningful opportunity to defend. In my view, as aptly identified by the application judge, the considerations raised by the appellants under the proposed new category are the same considerations as under the rubric of the natural justice defence. I would not give effect to the appellants’ arguments on this issue.”
 The defendants retained Chicago lawyer Rakesh Amin, and the U.S. points to evidence that the defendants paid him at least $120,000 in legal fees to appear on their behalf in the U.S. proceedings. The U.S. and Ontario orders permitted the defendants to seek access to frozen assets to pay legal fees. Through their lawyer, the defendants filed a defence, engaged in discovery, brought motions, requested and obtained extensions, and contested an FTC summary judgment motion. They also filed and argued an unsuccessful appeal de novo.
 In summary on this point, on the basis of the U.S. District Court record, including the comprehensive reasons for judgment of Judge St. Eve, there is nothing to suggest any unfairness to the defendants in the U.S. summary judgment proceeding. The defendants had a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
 Fifth, and particularly crucial in my view, in their appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendants made no natural justice or denial of a meaningful opportunity to be heard argument. The appeal related almost entirely to the defendants’ submission that Judge St. Eve erred by holding Yemec and Rapp liable for the various corporations’ allegedly deceptive practices: (2005), 415 F.3d 758.
 For these reasons, I conclude that there is no “new” defence relating to “a meaningful opportunity to be heard”. Such a defence is extremely circumscribed by a fair reading of Beals and King v. Drabinsky. In any event, even if there were such a defence, the defendants have not established it in this case. The U.S. court proceedings, trial and appeal, were fair throughout. The defendants received, and exercised, a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
The Court of Appeal similarly rejected the defendants’ argument (not raised previously ) on the scope of the ban on telemarketing as well as other injunctive relief:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Defendants George Yemec, Anita Rapp, and the Canadian Corporate Defendants, are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from engaging in, participating in, or assisting in the Telemarketing, in any manner, of any product or service to any person in the U.S.
“ The terms of the injunction are simple, clear and specific; it would be obvious to the defendants what they cannot do in the United States. The order could have been narrower, restraining only telemarketing activities relating to the sale of foreign lottery tickets. However, given Judge St. Eve’s ultimate conclusion that the defendants’ activities constituted deceptive practices in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(a) and the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 310, I cannot say that a complete prohibition of telemarketing aimed at people in the United States is unfair or unreasonable. Moreover, Judge St. Eve’s order specifically directed that the District Court would retain jurisdiction to enable any party to seek modifications to the order. Enforcement of the U.S. court order does not place an undue burden on the Canadian justice system. I can see no unforeseen obligations to which the defendants will be exposed. Compliance with U.S. law is not, of course, an unforeseen obligation. The U.S. court order does affect some third parties (it requires the defendants to provide information about their customers). However, this information is needed in light of the $19 million damages award; it is unlikely that consumers will object on privacy grounds to the release of contact information that might assist the U.S. government to distribute that amount. Finally, enforcement of the U.S. court order is consistent with the types of orders that would be allowed for domestic litigants.”
UNDERTAKING40.03 On a motion for an interlocutory injunction or mandatory order, the moving party shall, unless the court orders otherwise, undertake to abide by any order concerning damages that the court may make if it ultimately appears that the granting of the order has caused damage to the responding party for which the moving party ought to compensate the responding party. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 40.03.