Posts Tagged ‘Jurisdiction’

Tanya J. Monestier, “Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”

January 16, 2014

Tanya J. Monestier (Roger Williams University School of Law) has published “Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, The Advocates’ Quarterly, Vol. 42, p. 107, 2013/ Roger Williams Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 143. Here’s the abstract:

In April 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in what has become the pivotal case on personal jurisdiction in Canada, Van Breda v. Club Resorts Ltd. In Van Breda, the Court laid out a new framework for, and defined more precisely the content of, the “real and substantial connection” test that governs the assertion of jurisdiction over ex juris defendants. Specifically, the Court created four presumptive connecting factors that courts are to use in jurisdictional determinations. The presumptive connecting factors approach to jurisdiction was intended to increase certainty and predictability in jurisdictional determinations.

One issue that was alluded to, but ultimately left unanswered, by the Supreme Court in Van Breda was what effect the new presumptive factors framework for the real and substantial connection test had on the enforcement of judgments. Since the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye in 1990, it is well established law that the real and substantial connection test for jurisdiction simpliciter is intended to be “correlated” with the real and substantial connection test used as a predicate for enforcing foreign judgments. Does this mean that courts are now supposed to use the new Van Breda framework for jurisdiction simpliciter in the judgment enforcement context? This article argues that the real and substantial connection framework established by the Court in Van Breda for jurisdiction simpliciter should not be exported outside of the particular context in which it was developed. The Van Breda approach to jurisdiction simpliciter, although seemingly straightforward, is actually a blunt tool for assessing jurisdiction – and any concerns with its application would only be magnified if applied to the enforcement of foreign judgments.

A copy of the article is available at SSRN here.

Tanya J. Monestier, “(Still) a ‘Real and Substantial’ Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada”

May 10, 2013

Tanya J. Monestier (Roger Williams University School of Law) has published “(Still) a ‘Real and Substantial’ Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 36, p. 397, 2013/Roger Williams Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 136. The abstract reads:

In April 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada released the most important decision on personal jurisdiction in over twenty years. The Van Breda decision was intended to clarify, once and for all, the application of the “real and substantial connection” test to ex juris defendants. The Supreme Court in Van Breda adopted an approach to the real and substantial connection test that relied on the plaintiff fitting himself within one of four presumptive factors in order to establish jurisdiction: (a) The defendant is domiciled or resident in the province; (b) The defendant carries on business in the province; (c) The tort was committed in the province; (d) A contract connected with the dispute was made in the province. The Court also left open the possibility of creating additional presumptive factors in the future. The presumptive factors approach was intended to re-orient the jurisdictional test toward objective factual connections between the forum and the cause of action and to establish a simple and predictable framework for courts to use in making jurisdictional determinations. In this Article, I comprehensively examine the new presumptive factors approach to jurisdiction adopted by the Supreme Court in Van Breda with a view to exposing its shortcomings. I argue that this approach to jurisdiction – while simple and predictable on its face – will actually complicate jurisdictional determinations for the foreseeable future. Litigants will try to find creative ways to fit themselves within one of these four factors. And courts will spend years unpacking and defining the contours of the four presumptive factors. I also argue that the Court in Van Breda failed to provide meaningful guidance on how all pieces of the jurisdictional puzzle fit together. Among the outstanding questions: How does the real and substantial connection test work in non-tort cases? How do the traditional jurisdictional bases of consent and presence fit into the jurisdictional mix? Can the forum of necessity doctrine be reconciled with the real and substantial connection test? How does the test apply to the enforcement of foreign judgments? The Court simply left these hard questions until later. In short, while the Court in Van Breda was on the right track, it got derailed – which may ultimately mean another twenty years until the outstanding jurisdictional issues are sorted out.

Download a copy of the article at SSRN here.

Ontario Court of Appeal: Jurisdiction Simpliciter Established by Defendant’s Residence in Ontario and Attornment

February 26, 2013
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Court of Appeal window (Photo credit: lancea)

The Court of Appeal for Ontario in Zhang v. Hua Hai Li Steel Pipe Co. Ltd., 2013 ONCA 103 (CanLII), has reaffirmed that jurisdiction simpliciter is established by presence-based jurisdiction and consent-based jurisdiction (delivery of a Statement of Defence and other merit-based steps constitute attornment):

[5]         In our view, the appeal should be dismissed but for reasons different from those given by the motion judge.

[6]         This is not a jurisdictional case.  The respondents live and were served in Ontario and the Ontario courts accordingly have jurisdiction.  It is also significant that before the respondents brought the motion challenging the jurisdiction of the court, the appellants filed a statement of defence and took other steps in connection with the action.  Even if the appellants had not been served within Ontario, they have attorned to the jurisdiction.

[7]         The forum non conveniens issue is not relevant.

[8]         We see no merit in this appeal and it is therefore dismissed.

Elizabeth F. Judge, “Curious Judge: Judicial Notice of Facts, Independent Judicial Research, and the Impact of the Internet”

January 10, 2013

Elizabeth F. Judge (University of Ottawa – Faculty of Law (Common Law)) has posted “Curious Judge: Judicial Notice of Facts, Independent Judicial Research, and the Impact of the Internet”, Annual Review of Civil Litigation, pp. 325-350, Honourable Mr. Justice Todd L. Archibald Superior Court of Justice (Ontario) and the Late Honourable Mr. Justice Randall Scott Echlin, eds., 2012. The abstract reads:

Judicial notice allows uncontroversial facts to be established without evidentiary proof. The facts must either themselves be beyond dispute because they are “notorious” (that is, generally known within the community) or they must be able to be referenced in easily accessed sources whose accuracy is beyond dispute. Judicial notice is an especially vexing topic because it goes to the heart of the epistemological inquiry of the adversarial process and the nature of the judicial function. Judicial notice implicates the allocation of responsibilities for fact finding between the parties and the court, between the judge and the jury, between the court of first instance and the appellate bodies, and between the courts and the legislature; how fact finders engage in ordinary reasoning processes to decide what a fact is; the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts and their respective roles; and due process concerns for one or both parties. The rules governing judicially noticed facts are especially sensitive because whenever a fact is judicially noticed it is not subject to the ordinary processes for testing evidence, such as oaths and cross examination, and thus the rules implicate concerns about fairness to the parties and accuracy. For a common law precedential system, these concerns are particularly acute.

Drawing on American and Commonwealth commentators, this article provides a detailed analysis of the general theory and policy of judicial notice and the role of judicial notice in the adversarial system. The article then turns to a discussion of the practice of independent judicial research and an examination of the impact of the internet on judicial notice. The article analyses the laws and policies governing judicial notice of facts and independent judicial research in Canada and the Supreme Court of Canada’s legal framework. It examines independent judicial research and, most pertinently for modern practices of judicial notice, appropriate uses of internet search tools and online sources in the context of judicial notice. It considers how the internet is affecting key aspects pertaining to the judicial notice of facts: first, what “notoriety” and “community” mean; and second, what counts as an authoritative reference. The paper concludes by addressing how the internet, including search engines and online content, may affect the traditional framework for judicial notice of facts.

A copy of the paper is available for download via SSRN here.

Laura E. Little, “Internet Defamation, Freedom of Expression, and the Lessons of Private International Law for the United States”

December 19, 2012

Laura E. Little (Temple University – James E. Beasley School of Law) has published “Internet Defamation, Freedom of Expression, and the Lessons of Private International Law for the United States”, European Yearbook of Private International Law, Vol. 14, 2012. The abstract reads:

This article reviews current developments in U.S. conflict of laws doctrine pertaining to transnational internet defamation cases, including personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments. To resolve personal jurisdiction and choice of law issues in internet defamation cases, U.S. courts have adapted rules from the non-internet context with relative ease. Reported cases tend to concern domestic internet disputes between U.S. entities, with few plaintiffs attracted to U.S. courts for the purpose of litigating cross-border defamation claims. Although the U.S. serves as a magnet jurisdiction for many types of litigation, two liability-defeating laws render the country inhospitable to defamation claims: (1) the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment speech protections and (2) a statute affording immunity to internet “providers or users” for information “provided by another content provider.” Perhaps because of these provisions litigants are largely inspired to go elsewhere. The resulting libel tourism has prompted important U.S. developments pertaining to enforcement and recognition of foreign defamation judgments. Thus, for conflict of laws matters pertaining to internet defamation, it is judgments law that reflects the greatest activity and most profound change.

After reviewing personal jurisdiction and choice of law trends, this article describes legal developments pertaining to internet defamation judgments. The article critiques lawmakers’ adherence to First Amendment exceptionalism in regulating internet defamation judgments and identifies flaws reflected in state libel tourism statutes and the federal libel tourism statute, the SPEECH act of 2010.

Download the article via SSRN here.


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