Posts Tagged ‘Appeal’

Happy Trails and Happy Trials: Supreme Court of Canada Rules On the Test for Summary Judgment

January 23, 2014

 Today’s Supreme Court of Canada decisions on the summary judgment appeals in Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 and  Bruno Appliance and Furniture, Inc. v. Hryniak2014 SCC 8  offer a somewhat less than “full appreciation” of the test summary judgment established by the Court of Appeal for Ontario. [See my backgrounder on the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s “full appreciation” test  here.] 
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A Judicial Do-Over

January 2, 2014

I have long thought that an appeal court is more than merely a forum of last resort , a venue for judicial review, or a chamber of sober second thought.

The intrinsic value of appellate review lies within an appellate court’s power to correct errors of law: lower courts are best suited to be triers of fact. Let the evidentiary chips fall onto the table of justice, where they may.

Many trial lawyers appreciate the difference between the conduct of a trial and that of an appeal. Preserving the record on appeal is vitally important: objections must be stated clearly and unequivocally, but ultimately silence is an admission when it comes to raising grounds for appeal. Equally important is the fact that all cases are framed by the pleadings. If a trier of fact decides a case outside the bounds of the causes of action and defences pleaded, this constitutes a denial of natural justice and procedural fairness and strikes at the very root of the adversarial system: both the plaintiff and the defendants are entitled to know what the dispute is about and raise all arguments and adduce any evidence in support of their respective legal positions.

However, no one likes legal “technicalities”, not even lawyers. Depending on your views of the judicial decision-making process as deductive, inductive or reductive; a court must fairly, impartially and rationally use the process of judicial reasoning to resolve a dispute on its merits.

There is an “escape clause” built into the civil justice system: the fusion of law and equity that reflects the historical compromise of the exercise of judicial power over individuals (jurisdiction in the traditional sense of “juris” (the law”) and diction (“speaks) and that justice not only be done, but also be seen to be done. Consider section 96 of the Courts of Justice Act R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (as am) which reads:

Common Law and Equity

Rules of law and equity

96.(1)Courts shall administer concurrently all rules of equity and the common law. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 96 (1); 1993, c. 27, Sched.

Rules of equity to prevail

(2)Where a rule of equity conflicts with a rule of the common law, the rule of equity prevails. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 96 (2); 1993, c. 27, Sched.

Jurisdiction for equitable relief

(3)Only the Court of Appeal and the Superior Court of Justice, exclusive of the Small Claims Court, may grant equitable relief, unless otherwise provided. 1994, c. 12, s. 38; 1996, c. 25, s. 9 (17).

 Section 96 of the CJA is what I like to call the “judicial do-over”.

Let’s say you’re plaintiff’s counsel and you’ve persuaded the trial judge of the defendant’s liability, but proving the plaintiff’s damages poses to be a problem. Do you take your chances and hope the trial judge will award the plaintiff damages based upon a theory without expert evidence, or much evidence, for that matter? What do you do? Do you take your chances and hope the Court of Appeal will uphold the the trial judge’s assessment of damages, or will only nominal damages be awarded?  Is the fair and just result to order a new trial on the assessment of damages?

Read today’s decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in TMS Lighting Ltd. v. KJS Transport Inc., 2014 ONCA 1, per Cronk J.A. (Blair and Strathy JJ.A. concurring).and you be the judge:

(f) The question of remedy

[81] The appellants argue that any award of damages for TMS’s lost productivity should be nominal, at best. They submit that because the respondents’ nuisance-based damages theory was justifiably rejected at trial, and the trial judge’s substituted approach for the quantification of lost productivity damages is fatally flawed, the respondents must bear the consequences for their failure to lead the necessary evidence to establish the quantum of their damages. They rely, in this regard, on the trial judge’s findings that the respondents failed to adduce available evidence at trial that bore on their theory of lost productivity damages and that, as a result, an adverse inference should be drawn against the respondents regarding the utility of any such evidence. As a result of these factors, the appellants say, an award of only nominal damages is mandated.

[82] In the particular circumstances of this case, I would not accede to this argument.

[83] It is well-established that where the absence of evidence renders it impossible to assess damages, a plaintiff may be entitled to only nominal damages. Goldfarb, for example, says so. But this is not invariably the case. Where a plaintiff proves a substantial loss and the trial judge errs in the assessment of damages arising from that loss, the interests of justice may necessitate a new trial on damages. Although the quantification of damages flowing from the established loss may prove difficult, nonetheless the injured plaintiff is entitled to compensation.

[84] Goldfarb itself is a case in point. Goldfarb involved a claim for damages for breach of fiduciary duty advanced by the client of a law firm against the firm and the involved firm lawyer. This court held that there was inadequate cogent evidence to support the substantial award of damages made by the trial judge. Justice Finlayson explained, at para. 67:

[The plaintiff/client] failed to prove the losses through appropriate evidence. The trial judge’s award of damage is speculative at best, and does not reflect with much precision real losses flowing from the breach, notwithstanding that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving the losses in the normal course.

[85] Notwithstanding that the proffer of relevant evidence was “fully within the control of [the plaintiff]”, the Goldfarb court rejected the remedy of nominal damages and concluded that a new assessment of damages was necessary because the plaintiff had demonstrated a substantial personal loss although evidence proving the quantum of that loss was lacking: Goldfarb at paras. 80, 83 and 84. See also Rosenhek v. Windsor Regional Hospital, 2010 ONCA 13, 257 O.A.C. 283, at paras. 37-38, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 89.

[86] This reasoning is apposite here. On the trial judge’s findings, the respondents suffered a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of their lands, as well as trespass to those lands. The appellants’ nuisance and trespass were neither trivial nor transitory. To the contrary, they occurred over a sustained period and interfered, to a significant extent, with the respondents’ use and enjoyment of their lands for the purpose of TMS’s manufacturing operations. For approximately five years, disruption of TMS’s manufacturing operations led to reduced business productivity. This is a real wrong, which caused real loss.

[87] Damages, including damages for loss of revenues or profits, may be measured in various ways including, where appropriate, based on expert opinion evidence. That the manner of proof of lost productivity damages posited by the respondents at trial failed, does not mean that no proof is available. In all the circumstances, in my view, a new assessment of TMS’s lost productivity damages arising from the appellants’ proven nuisance and trespass is required in the interests of justice.

No Harm, No Foul?

March 14, 2013

Here’s something that made me do a double-take:

[6]          First, the appellant contends that the trial judge erred in relying on evidence given by counsel (Mr. Callahan) during his submissions.

[7]          We do not accept this submission.  Although Mr. Callahan was a named respondent in the application, the appellant consented to his appearance as counsel.  Moreover, on our review of the record, to the extent that Mr. Callahan’s submissions went beyond the record on factual issues, they were not relied on by the application judge.

[12] This is not a case for costs. Although we appreciate that the respondent did not object to Mr. Callahan appearing as counsel either here or below, the reality is that he was a named respondent and that his conduct was central to the factual circumstances giving rise to both the application and this appeal. He should not have appeared as counsel in either forum.

Huh? Did I read that excerpt correctly?

The respondent, a lawyer, appearing as counsel below and before the appeal panel does not constitute a palpable and overriding error?

The reason?

The appellant’s consent?

What about procedural fairness and the court’s inherent jurisdiction in controlling its own process and avoiding bringing the administration of justice into disrepute?

How about the fact that the lawyer is an officer of the court and under the Rules of Professional Conduct owes a duty to uphold the integrity of the legal profession and the public administration of justice by avoiding real or apprehended conflicts of interest?

What about the prohibition against appearing as counsel in one’s own cause?

Ricciuto v. Somers2013 ONCA 153 (Ont. C.A.) per curiam: Doherty, MacPherson and Watt JJ.A.

Ontario Court of Appeal: Jurisdiction Simpliciter Established by Defendant’s Residence in Ontario and Attornment

February 26, 2013
Court of Appeal window

Court of Appeal window (Photo credit: lancea)

The Court of Appeal for Ontario in Zhang v. Hua Hai Li Steel Pipe Co. Ltd., 2013 ONCA 103 (CanLII), has reaffirmed that jurisdiction simpliciter is established by presence-based jurisdiction and consent-based jurisdiction (delivery of a Statement of Defence and other merit-based steps constitute attornment):

[5]         In our view, the appeal should be dismissed but for reasons different from those given by the motion judge.

[6]         This is not a jurisdictional case.  The respondents live and were served in Ontario and the Ontario courts accordingly have jurisdiction.  It is also significant that before the respondents brought the motion challenging the jurisdiction of the court, the appellants filed a statement of defence and took other steps in connection with the action.  Even if the appellants had not been served within Ontario, they have attorned to the jurisdiction.

[7]         The forum non conveniens issue is not relevant.

[8]         We see no merit in this appeal and it is therefore dismissed.

Does a lawyer’s duty of care extend to reviewing applicable limitation periods with a client?

January 22, 2013

Lawyer and Client - Cartoon

Does a lawyer’s duty of care extend to reviewing applicable limitation periods with a client?

The Court of Appeal for Ontario says: “No”:

[1] The appellant raises two issues on this appeal.

[2] First, she says the trial judge erred in finding that the respondent was not obliged to reduce to writing that he was not retained to act on the tort and accident benefit claims. We do not agree.

[3] Given the basis on which this appeal proceeded it is clear that the trial judge found as a fact that the appellant, despite her health challenges, understood what she had and had not retained the respondent for. There was no basis in the evidence, given these facts, to extend the respondent’s duty of care to putting in writing what the appellant already understood, namely that she had not retained him for the tort and accident benefit claims.

[4] Second, the appellant says that the trial judge erred in failing to decide whether the respondent’s duty of care extended to reviewing the applicable limitation periods with her.

[5] Again, we do not agree. The trail judge found that the appellant had not established that the respondent’s duty to her extended to this and had called no expert evidence that would suggest otherwise. There is no basis for us to interfere with that finding. Moreover, the trial judge clearly found as a fact that the respondent had reviewed the limitation periods with her thereby satisfying any duty had one been found to exist.

[6] In all the circumstances the appeal must be dismissed, with costs fixed at $6,000 in total in favour of the respondent.

Broesky v. Lüst, 2012 ONCA 701 (Ont. C.A.) per Goudge, Simmons and Juriansz JJ.A.


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