Civil procedure scholars have extensively discussed the new 12(b)(6) standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. In this discourse, however, an interesting development has not been explored. The standard for the motion to dismiss has evolved in such a way as to make the motion to dismiss the new summary judgment motion. Despite different words in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56 and no discovery before dismissal under 12(b)(6), the new 12(b)(6) dismissal standard now tracks the standard for summary judgment. Moreover, the motion to dismiss under the new summary judgment-like standard may have effects similar to those experienced under summary judgment, including a significant use of the procedure by courts, a related increased role for judges in litigation and a corresponding increased dismissal of employment discrimination cases. This essay describes the similarities between the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment, and also explains how, as a result of these similarities, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema may no longer be good law. This essay further proposes that differences between the motions, including discovery, cost and the role of the courts, call into question the propriety of the changes under Iqbal and Twombly.
Archive for the ‘Rule 56’ Category
Suja A. Thomas [SSRN] on "The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly"November 18, 2009
Yet another article on pleadings standards in the wake of the Supreme Court of the United States decisions in Iqbal and Twombly. This one is by Suja A. Thomas (University of Illinois College of Law) entitled:“The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly” . Here is the abstract: