Archive for the ‘Public Figure’ Category

Matthew Lafferman, “Do Facebook and Twitter Make You a Public Figure?: How to Apply the Gertz Public Figure Doctrine to Social Media”

March 13, 2013

Matthew Lafferman (JD Candidate, George Mason University – School of Law) has published “Do Facebook and Twitter Make You a Public Figure?: How to Apply the Gertz Public Figure Doctrine to Social Media”,  Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2012. Here’s the abstract:

In Gertz v. Welch, the Supreme Court expanded First Amendment protections to defamation law by requiring a plaintiff who qualified as a public figure to prove a higher burden of proof to recover for damages under a defamation suit. The Court relied on two major rationales to delineate the Gertz doctrine: public figures “voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury” and had “significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication.” Applying this doctrine to online media poses challenges, specifically when applied to social media platforms. Many scholars have recognized that social media users have equal access to the same basic media features, rendering the Gertz Court’s access-to the-media rationale inapplicable when applied to social media. A 216% rise in defamation suits against Internet users in the last three years alone, due to the recent discovery that most homeowner’s insurance policies cover libel liability, signals an almost inevitable rise in defamation suits that will eventually force courts to face the challenge of applying the Gertz public figure doctrine to social media.

This Comment offers an approach that reconciles the problems of applying the public figure doctrine to social media. This Comment argues that courts should require defendants to overcome certain initial presumptions by clear and convincing evidence before designating a social media user an involuntary public figure or a general public figure. Moreover, when recommending an approach for courts to identify voluntary activity on a social network for limited-purpose public figures, courts should avoid defining mere access to social media as voluntary activity and instead conclude such access is an extension of an individual’s private life. This approach would allow courts to apply much of the currently existing public figure doctrine to social media and help courts avoid the negative legal and policy consequences of abolishing the doctrine altogether.

A pdf copy of the paper is available for download at SSRN here.

An Open Letter to Alberta Premier Alison Redford

October 5, 2012
English: Alison Redford

English: Alison Redford (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The Honourable Alison Merrilla Redford, Q.C., MLA,
Premier of Alberta
Office of the Premier Room 307,
Legislature Building
10800-97 Avenue
Edmonton, Alberta
T5K 2B7

Dear Premier:

I read with an abiding interest a news story by Calgary Herald reporter Darcy Henton dated October 4, 2012 entitled “ Redford defends compensation for law society dues“. Henton writes:

Premier Alison Redford says it is “entirely appropriate” for her to bill taxpayers for her Law Society of Alberta membership dues, but lawyers who serve as opposition MLAs called the practice “ridiculous” and “a gross misuse of taxpayers’ dollars.”

Redford told reporters at a Chamber of Commerce conference at Enoch’s River Cree Resort that it is the practice of the Alberta government to pay the professional membership fees for “people that are practising professions.”

“I am a member of the Law Society in good standing,” she said.

“As justice minister I was the chief legal adviser for the province. I think it was entirely appropriate.”

She said that didn’t change when she became premier.

“From my perspective, it’s part of my professional standing,” she said.

“It’s one of the things I stand forward with and say, that I am proud of the fact I am a member of a profession with a great deal of integrity. It is part of what has been government policy.”

By way of background, I am a member of the Law Society of Upper Canada, admitted to the Ontario bar in 1993.

The purpose of this letter is to highlight what I consider, on your part, to be a fundamental misunderstanding of your role as an elected public official, who also happens to be a lawyer. (more…)

Quinshawna Landon, “The First Amendment and Speech-Based Torts: Recalibrating the Balance”

March 16, 2011

Quinshawna Landon (University of Miami – University of Miami Law Review) has published, “The First Amendment and Speech-Based Torts: Recalibrating the Balance”, University of Miami Law Review, forthcoming. The abstract reads:

The Supreme Court was correct in employing the public concern standard in its recent decision of Snyder v. Phelps. However, the Court was incorrect in limiting its decision to the facts of the case. By doing this, the Court allowed the public figure/private figure distinction to remain in tact. Thus, the protections of free speech are contingent upon the status of a person rather than on the function of the speech, which is the true goal of the First Amendment.

This Article contends that the public figure/private figure distinction should be abandoned. Several of the rationales underpinning the doctrine are no longer viable today. In addition, this article asserts that the public figure doctrine should be supplanted by the public concern standard. The public concern test will implicate the First Amendment and apply the actual malice standard to speech concerning all activities that relate to the function of government such as issues of social, educational, and political importance. Categorizing speech by a person’s status does not calibrate the appropriate balance between tort liability and the First Amendment. It leaves some individual’s vulnerable to the harms of speech-based torts while leaving some categories of speech unprotected. By focusing on the function of the speech rather than the status of the speaker, the public concern standard will more adequately protect free speech and better effectuate the purposes of the First Amendment.

Part I will discuss the competing goals of the First Amendment and speech-based torts. While speech-based torts are designed to protect an individual from harm such as injury to one’s reputation, emotional well-being, or invasion to one’s privacy, the First Amendment is intended to protect the free flow of ideas in society, the ability to access information that will allow society to govern itself, and the ability to express oneself freely. Part I will examine the purposes of each and determine why it is important to balance the interests of both concepts. Part II delineates an historical perspective of the public figure/private figure distinction and analyzes the evolution and purpose of the doctrine in First Amendment jurisprudence. Part III argues that the public concern standard is the best method of protecting free speech and preserving First Amendment principles. It contends that the public figure/private figure distinction should be abandoned because the rationales underpinning the standard – that private figures deserve greater protection because they enjoy less access to the channels of effective communication and that they have not thrust themselves into the limelight in order to influence public debate – are no longer viable today.

Finally, Part IV presents three case studies: a public official wrongfully accused by a blogger of allowing her racial bias to influence her duties as a government agent; a published article falsely alleging that a public figure cheats on his wife; and the Snyder case. It finds that in all examples the public concern standard produces a better and more equitable outcome than the current controlling standard.

The article is available for download at SSRN here.


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 1,587 other followers

%d bloggers like this: