Archive for the ‘Ontario’ Category

Happy Trails and Happy Trials: Supreme Court of Canada Rules On the Test for Summary Judgment

January 23, 2014

 Today’s Supreme Court of Canada decisions on the summary judgment appeals in Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 and  Bruno Appliance and Furniture, Inc. v. Hryniak2014 SCC 8  offer a somewhat less than “full appreciation” of the test summary judgment established by the Court of Appeal for Ontario. [See my backgrounder on the Court of Appeal for Ontario's "full appreciation" test  here.] 
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What’s The Difference Between Partial Indemnity and Substantial Indemnity Costs?

August 19, 2013

Image via stephensockett.com

Newbould J. in Stetson Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Stifel Nicolaus Canada Inc , 2013 ONSC 5213 has done many Ontario litigators a great service by making the calculation of costs less of an art and more of a science.

Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, (as am.) [the "RCP"] sets out the general principles and factors for the court to consider when exercising its discretion to award costs under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Sub-rule 57.01(5) of the RCP requires a party who is awarded costs to serve a bill of costs (Form 57A) on the other parties and file it with proof of service.

Pursuant to sub-rule 57.01(6) of the RCP, unless there is prior agreement on costs, each party intending to seek costs for any step in the proceeding must bring to the hearing a costs outline (Form 57B) not exceeding three pages.

The common approach is to set out the lawyer’s name, year of call and hourly rate and provide a table with three columns: Actual Rate, Partial Indemnity Rate and Substantial Indemnity Rate. The degree of variation of what comprises the partial indemnity or substantial indemnity rate is well-known. Some lawyers specify 50% for partial indemnity, while others set out 60%, or more. As far as substantial indemnity rates are concerned, I have seen some lawyers claim between 75% to over 90%, approaching Full Indemnity Rate.

Fortunately, Justice Newbould has provided a straightforward calculation as follows:

[25]           I think it appropriate to award costs at 60% of the time charged for partial indemnity costs and 90% for substantial indemnity costs for the work after the offer to settle. The rates charged, however, must be reduced because the rates have been claimed throughout at the 2013 rates.

Trying to fake a judgment? What were the plaintiffs thinking?

February 1, 2013


[38] I have no hesitation in concluding that an award of full indemnity costs is required in the circumstances of this case. I find that the plaintiffs’ conduct, in faking a judgment of this court, constitutes a scurrilous and fraudulent attack on the administration of justice. The plaintiffs’ actions amount to a contemptuous and reckless disregard for the judicial process and were calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice in these proceedings. The plaintiffs’ behaviour was “reprehensible, scandalous and outrageous.” Such reckless attacks on the administration of justice clearly constitute conduct requiring chastisement and deterrence.

[39] I find that the defendants are entitled to full indemnity costs, payable by the plaintiffs D’Souza and D’Gama forthwith. Costs are awarded as follows:

Woldanskas $14,974.60

Linton/Jagielski $10,659.35

Gills $14, 617.97

inclusive of disbursements and HST.

[40] The plaintiffs are prohibited from taking any fresh step in these proceedings until these costs have been paid in full.

Master Dash Order

[41] There is a subsidiary issue involving an order of Master Dash on April 26, 2011, obtained without notice, granting leave to the plaintiffs to register a certificate of pending litigation against the Property (the CPL order). No CPL has been registered as yet.

[42] The plaintiffs have refused or been unable to produce the original of Master Dash’s order. The court record apparently contains no original order or endorsed motion record.

[43] It appears that the CPL order of Master Dash may also be a fake.

[44] In any event, it was obtained without notice. The noting in default of the Gills was improper and constituted sharp practice.

[45] In the circumstances, my order shall issue setting aside the CPL order of Master Dash dated April 26, 2011.

Read the decision of Penny J. in John Joseph AKA John D’Souza and Peter D’Gama v. Ritchie James Linton, et al. 2013 ONSC 70  here.

Emir Crowne et al. “‘Fully Appreciating’ the Ontario Court of Appeal’s Views on the Summary Judgment Rule”

April 13, 2012
Civil Procedure Rules

Civil Procedure Rules (Photo credit: septuagesima)

Emir Crowne (University of Windsor – Faculty of Law), Varoujan Arman (Blaney McMurtry LLP) and Terry Reid (Gardiner Roberts LLP) have posted “‘Fully Appreciating’ the Ontario Court of Appeal’s Views on the Summary Judgment Rule”, Advocates’ Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 3, February 2012. The article analyzes the five combined appeals heard by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, 2011 ONCA 764, which issued guidelines to first instance judges when faced with motions for summary judgment.

Download a pdf copy of the article from SSRN here.

See also my previous post: “Ontario Court of Appeal Introduces New “Full Appreciation” Test for Summary Judgment”

Ontario Court of Appeal Introduces New “Full Appreciation” Test for Summary Judgment

December 5, 2011

The Court of Appeal for Ontario has released an important decision in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch2011 ONCA 764 ["Flesch"], which creates a new judicial test for summary judgment: the “full appreciation” test. (more…)


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