Archive for the ‘Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure’ Category

Trying to fake a judgment? What were the plaintiffs thinking?

February 1, 2013


[38] I have no hesitation in concluding that an award of full indemnity costs is required in the circumstances of this case. I find that the plaintiffs’ conduct, in faking a judgment of this court, constitutes a scurrilous and fraudulent attack on the administration of justice. The plaintiffs’ actions amount to a contemptuous and reckless disregard for the judicial process and were calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice in these proceedings. The plaintiffs’ behaviour was “reprehensible, scandalous and outrageous.” Such reckless attacks on the administration of justice clearly constitute conduct requiring chastisement and deterrence.

[39] I find that the defendants are entitled to full indemnity costs, payable by the plaintiffs D’Souza and D’Gama forthwith. Costs are awarded as follows:

Woldanskas $14,974.60

Linton/Jagielski $10,659.35

Gills $14, 617.97

inclusive of disbursements and HST.

[40] The plaintiffs are prohibited from taking any fresh step in these proceedings until these costs have been paid in full.

Master Dash Order

[41] There is a subsidiary issue involving an order of Master Dash on April 26, 2011, obtained without notice, granting leave to the plaintiffs to register a certificate of pending litigation against the Property (the CPL order). No CPL has been registered as yet.

[42] The plaintiffs have refused or been unable to produce the original of Master Dash’s order. The court record apparently contains no original order or endorsed motion record.

[43] It appears that the CPL order of Master Dash may also be a fake.

[44] In any event, it was obtained without notice. The noting in default of the Gills was improper and constituted sharp practice.

[45] In the circumstances, my order shall issue setting aside the CPL order of Master Dash dated April 26, 2011.

Read the decision of Penny J. in John Joseph AKA John D’Souza and Peter D’Gama v. Ritchie James Linton, et al. 2013 ONSC 70  here.

The discovery principle and limitation of actions for solicitor’s negligence:Ferrara v. Lorenzetti, Wolfe Barristers and Solicitors (Ont. C.A)

December 4, 2012

Today’s decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Ferrara v. Lorenzetti, Wolfe Barristers and Solicitors, 2012 ONCA 851 deals with the discoverability principle and limitation of actions for solicitor’s negligence. (more…)

Emir Crowne et al. “‘Fully Appreciating’ the Ontario Court of Appeal’s Views on the Summary Judgment Rule”

April 13, 2012
Civil Procedure Rules

Civil Procedure Rules (Photo credit: septuagesima)

Emir Crowne (University of Windsor – Faculty of Law), Varoujan Arman (Blaney McMurtry LLP) and Terry Reid (Gardiner Roberts LLP) have posted “‘Fully Appreciating’ the Ontario Court of Appeal’s Views on the Summary Judgment Rule”, Advocates’ Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 3, February 2012. The article analyzes the five combined appeals heard by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, 2011 ONCA 764, which issued guidelines to first instance judges when faced with motions for summary judgment.

Download a pdf copy of the article from SSRN here.

See also my previous post: “Ontario Court of Appeal Introduces New “Full Appreciation” Test for Summary Judgment”

Regional Senior Justice Edward Then: Case Management Masters will begin to hear bankruptcy matters in Toronto

February 3, 2012

Via the Section Executives of Civil Litigation and Insolvency for the Ontario Bar Association:

Matthew Nied, “Unmasking Anonymous Defendants in Internet Defamation Cases”

March 14, 2011

Matthew Nied has published, “Unmasking Anonymous Defendants in Internet Defamation Cases: Recent Developments and Unresolved Issues”, Canadian Privacy Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 31, 2011. Here’s the abstract:

While the internet provides users with an environment in which socially valuable speech can flourish, it also provides users with an opportunity to defame others behind a shield of anonymity. If these users can be identified, they may be held liable for defamation. Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the identities of these users are usually known only by the website or internet service provider (“ISP”) through which the statements were made, and these third parties generally decline to disclose a user’s identity in the absence of a court order compelling them to do so. Faced with a growing stream of applications for such orders, courts have sought to consistently assess them in a way that strikes an appropriate balance between the freedom of expression and privacy interests of anonymous defendants and the reputational interests of plaintiffs.

Currently, there are two ways for plaintiffs to compel third parties to disclose the identity of anonymous defendants: by seeking an equitable remedy of discovery known as a “Norwich order”, or by seeking pre-action discovery or production under the applicable rules of civil procedure. Although courts have developed these approaches to strike a more appropriate balance between the competing interests, two unresolved issues remain to threaten that balance. First, while the approaches are similar, they differ with respect to the protection that they afford to the privacy and freedom of expression interests of anonymous defendants. Second, neither approach requires that anonymous defendants be informed of applications for the disclosure of their identities in order to enable them to represent their interests. This article surveys the two approaches, discusses the unresolved issues, and considers how courts may address them.

The article is available for download at SSRN here.


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 1,587 other followers

%d bloggers like this: