Archive for the ‘libel’ Category

Hilary Young, “Adding Insult to Injury in Corporate Defamation Damages”

September 3, 2013

Hilary Young (University of New Brunswick – Fredericton – Faculty of Law) has posted “Adding Insult to Injury in Corporate Defamation Damages”. Here’s the abstract:

The law of defamation treats corporations almost identically to natural persons. In most common law countries, corporations may bring defamation actions, and the elements are the same for corporate plaintiffs as for natural person plaintiffs, as are the defences. So too, are the principles for awarding damages.

Both people and corporations have valuable reputations worthy of legal protection. However, given the significantly different effect of reputational injury on humans than on corporations, the principles applied in quantifying damages to each should differ. Aggravating factors relating to emotional injuries should not be considered in assessing reputational injury to corporations, because corporations cannot suffer such injuries. Specifically, I focus on the relevance to the quantification of damages of: a) the defendant’s failure to apologize; b) the defendant’s malice; and c) the aim of vindicating reputation. Examples are drawn primarily from Canadian law but also from the laws of other common law countries.

The article first argues against treating a defendant’s failure to apologize to a corporation as a factor aggravating damages. The only relevance to a corporation of an apology is as a form of setting the record straight. Thus, an apology may mitigate damages but a failure to apologize will often have no effect on damages. Yet the law treats a failure to apologize as aggravating damages.

Similarly, the defendant’s malice is considered a factor aggravating damages, but since corporations cannot be upset, embarrassed or insulted, it is not clear that malice should be relevant to calculating their compensatory damages.

Finally, courts should no longer award damages in order to vindicate corporate reputation. The interest in human dignity may justify the vindicatory goal of defamation law. However, given that corporations have no dignity to protect, and given a number of problems associated with attempting to award damages to vindicate reputation, it is not justifiable to award corporations damages to vindicate their reputations.

Download a pdf copy of the paper via SSRN here.

Ont. C.A.: Libel and Slander Act notice and limitation periods apply to internet libel; “single publication” rule rejected

June 18, 2013

The Court of Appeal for Ontario judgment in Shtaif v. Toronto Life Publishing Co. Ltd., 2013 ONCA 405 (Ont. C.A.) (“Shtaif“) confirms that the six-week notice requirement and three-month limitation period under the  Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. L.12 (the “Act”), not the 2-year general limitation period in s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O 2002 c.24, governs libel actions based on online versions of newspaper articles. (more…)

I Think This Guy Just LIBEL SLANDERED Me (UPDATED)

June 18, 2013

Comments ‹ THE TRIAL WARRIOR BLOG — WordPress

UPDATE:

I would be remiss if I failed to mention that J. Kirby Inwood sent me this email back on April 4th, 2013, even though he doesn’t like me very much:

CanLaw1

CanLaw2

 

Related Posts:

CanLaw Lawyer Directory: Some People Never Learn (trialwarrior.com)

A Few Modest Proposals to the LSUC on Lawyer Directories (trialwarrior.com)

LSUC Issues Warning Concerning Lawyer Referral Service (trialwarrior.com)

McAlpine v. Bercow and a New Era of ‘Twitter Chill’

May 24, 2013

The decision of Mr Justice Tugendhat in McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB) (24 May 2013) ["McAlpine"]  is a stern admonition to Twitter users about the perils of practising comedy without a license.

Seriously, in my view, the UK court’s  judgment will have a chilling effect on free speech on Twitter and will likely devolve into an era of social media self-censorship for Twitter users, particularly in the UK. A form of libel chill, or, perhaps “Twitter Chill”.

It also highlights the legal chasm that exists between the American and UK judicial approaches to balancing freedom of expression and protecting reputation. The decision also raises the spectre of a “popularity metric” to determine whether the alleged maker or republisher of the defamatory tweet has gazillions of followers or is just some shlub with 4 followers, three of which are porn bots. (more…)

Laura E. Little, “Internet Defamation, Freedom of Expression, and the Lessons of Private International Law for the United States”

December 19, 2012

Laura E. Little (Temple University – James E. Beasley School of Law) has published “Internet Defamation, Freedom of Expression, and the Lessons of Private International Law for the United States”, European Yearbook of Private International Law, Vol. 14, 2012. The abstract reads:

This article reviews current developments in U.S. conflict of laws doctrine pertaining to transnational internet defamation cases, including personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments. To resolve personal jurisdiction and choice of law issues in internet defamation cases, U.S. courts have adapted rules from the non-internet context with relative ease. Reported cases tend to concern domestic internet disputes between U.S. entities, with few plaintiffs attracted to U.S. courts for the purpose of litigating cross-border defamation claims. Although the U.S. serves as a magnet jurisdiction for many types of litigation, two liability-defeating laws render the country inhospitable to defamation claims: (1) the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment speech protections and (2) a statute affording immunity to internet “providers or users” for information “provided by another content provider.” Perhaps because of these provisions litigants are largely inspired to go elsewhere. The resulting libel tourism has prompted important U.S. developments pertaining to enforcement and recognition of foreign defamation judgments. Thus, for conflict of laws matters pertaining to internet defamation, it is judgments law that reflects the greatest activity and most profound change.

After reviewing personal jurisdiction and choice of law trends, this article describes legal developments pertaining to internet defamation judgments. The article critiques lawmakers’ adherence to First Amendment exceptionalism in regulating internet defamation judgments and identifies flaws reflected in state libel tourism statutes and the federal libel tourism statute, the SPEECH act of 2010.

Download the article via SSRN here.


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